Fordham Law Review
Volume 89

Issue 2

Article 1

2020

Measuring the Impact of SEC Enforcement Decisions
Stephen J. Choi
Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, NYU School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Choi, Measuring the Impact of SEC Enforcement Decisions, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 385 (2020).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss2/1

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SYMPOSIUM
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF SEC
ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS
Stephen J. Choi*
This Article examines several metrics of Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) decision-making that may be updated on a regular basis
using publicly available data to give a picture of how SEC decision-making
changes. This Article focuses on SEC actions against public companies and
subsidiaries of public companies, using data from 2005 to 2018. The metrics
include: the number of SEC actions per year and per month, the ratio of SEC
actions to securities class actions by year, the mean abnormal return from
an event study of the first public announcement of the problem that led to the
eventual SEC enforcement action by year, the fraction of SEC actions with
prior disclosure of the underlying violation by year, and the variability of a
defendant company’s stock price reaction to the initiation of an SEC action
by year. The metrics cannot demonstrate what motivates internal SEC
enforcement decisions with certainty but may raise questions that guide
future research.
INTRODUCTION
Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934
and tasked the agency with the enforcement of the U.S. securities laws.1
Today, the SEC enjoys wide discretion in its enforcement decisions,
including decisions on whether to bring an action at all, against whom to
bring the action, the timing of the initiation and resolution of the action, the
venue of enforcement (civil court or an administrative proceeding), and the

* Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. This Article was
prepared for the Symposium entitled Securities and Consumer Litigation—Pathways and
Hurdles, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy
on February 28, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. Thanks for helpful comments
to Jill Fisch, Un Kyung Park, and the participants at the ILEP 2020 Conference, including the
commentators, Adam Pritchard and Robert Jackson, and the moderator, Laura Posner. Thanks
also to Urska Velikonja for sharing her list of SEC enforcement actions to check against my
dataset of SEC enforcement actions used in this Article.

1. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical
Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 329, 338, 347–52 (1988).
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remedy sought from enforcement.2 While the specific characteristics of the
underlying securities law violation play into the enforcement decisions, other
factors, including the prevailing political environment, media attention, and
the SEC’s changing priorities, may also affect these choices.
Under its discretion, the SEC brought an enforcement action against
Citigroup in October 2011, alleging misleading disclosures related to
Citigroup’s involvement in a specific collateralized debt obligation during
the late 2000s financial crisis.3 The SEC brought lighter charges than at least
some in the market had expected and chose not to charge any top officers or
directors of Citigroup, required Citigroup to pay $285 million (which
represented 0.3 percent of Citigroup’s market capitalization at the time), and
allowed Citigroup to settle without admitting or denying the SEC’s
allegations.4
Despite the relatively light SEC enforcement action,5 the market
commentary at the time also noted that the federal district judge presiding
over the action, Judge Jed S. Rakoff, may not accept the settlement.6 Judge
Rakoff indeed rejected the settlement in November 2011, only to be
overruled by the Second Circuit in 2014.7
Relatively little empirical work exists that assesses the SEC’s ongoing
enforcement choices. The SEC enforcement division publishes an annual
report that details its prior fiscal year’s overall number of enforcement
actions divided by different subject matter categories.8 Both New York

2. See Molchatsky v. United States, 713 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he SEC
retains complete discretion over when, whether and to what extent to investigate and bring an
action against an individual or entity.”). For a discussion of the SEC’s discretion to bring
enforcement actions either in civil court or as an administrative proceeding, see David Zaring,
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1157–59, 1164–65 (2016).
3. See Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d. 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-07387).
4. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle
SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm [https://perma.cc/U37N-58R5].
On
October 19, 2011, Citigroup’s stock price closed at $29.39 per share with 2.92 billion shares
outstanding, giving Citigroup a market capitalization of $85.76 billion at the time of the
settlement. See CRSP Daily Stock: Citigroup Inc., CRSP U.S. STOCK DATABASES,
http://www.crsp.org/products/research-products/crsp-us-stock-databases [https://perma.cc/
6NW8-PSXE] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (on file with author).
5. See Jesse Elsinger & Jake Bernstein, Did Citi Get a Sweet Deal?: Bank Claims SEC
Settlement on One CDO Clears It on All Others, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2011),
https://www.propublica.org/article/did-citi-get-a-sweet-deal-banks-says-sec-settlement-onone-cdo-clears-it-on [https://perma.cc/SF7U-J4B9].
6. See Peter Lattman, Citigroup Deal to Go to Judge Critical of S.E.C. Practices, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/citigroup-deal-to-go-tojudge-critical-of-s-e-c-practices [https://perma.cc/SDB9-DY9D].
7. See Kevin LaCroix, Second Circuit Vacates Judge Rakoff’s Rejection of SEC’s
Citigroup Settlement, D&O DIARY (June 4, 2014), https://www.dandodiary.com/2014/06/
articles/securities-litigation/second-circuit-vacates-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-secs-citigroupsettlement [https://perma.cc/7U6A-LSQ6].
8. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT (2019),
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2FH-
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University’s (NYU) Securities Enforcement Empirical Database (SEED)
project and Urska Velikonja, a professor at Georgetown University Law
Center, have published reports analyzing the SEC’s published enforcement
numbers.9
In this Article, I explore possible metrics of SEC enforcement decisionmaking using a dataset of all SEC enforcement actions from 2005 to 2018
against public companies and subsidiaries of public companies. While the
SEC also enforces against nonpublic companies and individuals, this Article
focuses on public companies and subsidiaries of public companies because
securities violations by these entities typically affect large numbers of
investors.10 Thus, enforcement against such violations will have a greater
impact on investor protection and on the capital markets.
To assess the impact of SEC decisions, a theoretical first-best metric would
compare the actual world with how the world would look without SEC
enforcement, keeping everything else the same, and measure the change in
investor (or possibly overall social) welfare between these two worlds. Such
a measure, however, would be difficult if not impossible to construct.
Instead, this Article focuses its analysis on more limited but obtainable
metrics. First, it looks at the aggregate number of SEC actions against public
companies and subsidiaries of public companies annually. Other factors,
such as the overall number of securities law violations in the economy and
how the SEC applies its discretion in enforcement decisions, may affect the
number of enforcement actions each year. To control for these other factors,
this Article examines the number of SEC actions relative to a possible control
for the number of violations in the economy: the number of private securities
class actions. To the extent outside factors that determine the number of
violations in the economy may affect the number of SEC actions and
securities class actions in a similar way over time, examining the relationship
of SEC actions to securities class actions will at least partially control for
these outside factors and isolate the effect of SEC decision-making on
enforcement numbers.
Second, this Article looks at the stock price reaction to the first public
disclosure of the underlying securities law violations that led to the SEC
enforcement actions. Not all securities law violations have the same impact
on investors and the economy. Egregious fraud by a company involving
scienter on the part of corporate officers will typically have a much larger
negative stock price reaction upon the first public announcement of the
7KXK]. Note that the SEC’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30 of the following
year.
9. The NYU SEED project is a joint venture between Cornerstone Research and NYU’s
Pollack Center for Law and Business. See NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR L. & BUS.,
https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/pollackcenterlawbusiness/seed
[https://perma.cc/LS23KYSC] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020); see also Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance:
Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 910–11 (2016)
(critiquing the SEC’s reporting of enforcement numbers).
10. In the case of defendant entities that are subsidiaries of public companies, I look at the
stock price reaction of the public parent company.
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violation than a more technical violation of the securities laws without
scienter. Examining the average stock price reaction to the first public
disclosure of the underlying securities law violations targeted for
enforcement actions provides a measure of the egregiousness of the
violations that the SEC chooses to pursue.
Third, this Article looks at the relative proportion of SEC actions where
there was disclosure of the underlying violations prior to the enforcement
action against those where there was no prior disclosure. To the extent
companies uncover securities law violations and consider these violations
material to investors, the companies will tend to disclose these violations.
Violations with a potentially larger market impact will also involve a greater
likelihood that third parties, such as reporters and short-selling firms, will
uncover the violations prior to the SEC action and make these violations
public. Comparing those SEC actions with and without prior disclosure
provides an alternate method of assessing the magnitude of the underlying
securities law violations that the SEC chooses to target for enforcement.
Fourth, this Article looks at the variability of the stock price reaction to the
first public announcement of the SEC enforcement action, as measured by
the standard deviation of the stock price reaction to the announcement of the
action. The variability will encompass the market’s reaction to the SEC’s
choices regarding the enforcement action, including the forum (civil court or
administrative proceeding), alleged violations charged, specific defendants,
and penalties sought. Particularly for actions with prior disclosure of the
underlying violation, the market will previously have formed an expectation
of how the SEC will use its enforcement discretion. The market reaction to
the announcement of the actual enforcement will reflect the unexpected
nature of the SEC enforcement action. This Article posits that in times of
policy change at the SEC, the market may have a harder time predicting how
the SEC will bring enforcement actions from the prior disclosure of
underlying securities law violations and thus, the standard deviation of stock
price reactions on the eventual enforcement disclosure date will increase.
The metrics this Article examines are, of course, imperfect but, when
tracked over time, hopefully add insight beyond the simple tabulated
numbers the SEC annually provides. Even imperfect metrics can assist in
providing greater transparency in the SEC’s enforcement function. The
metrics cannot demonstrate with certainty what motivates internal SEC
enforcement decisions but may raise questions that guide future research.
I. THE DATASET
To develop metrics assessing SEC enforcement, I employ a dataset of all
SEC enforcement actions initiated from 2005 to 2018 involving public
companies and subsidiaries of public companies. The dataset combines
information on SEC enforcement actions collected by the SEED project from
2010 to 2018 that I obtained from NYU’s Pollack Center for Law and
Business as well as information I hand coded from 2005 to 2009 using
enforcement documents obtained from the SEC’s website. I define public
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companies as including all companies traded on a major U.S. exchange, as
identified by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database
either at the time of the start of the SEC enforcement action or in the fiveyear period prior to the start of the enforcement action.11 I include
subsidiaries of public companies because many financial institutions are
organized in a holding company structure with operating companies as
subsidiaries. I exclude SEC actions involving delinquent SEC filings. These
actions do not require any showing of negligence or scienter on the part of
the corporate defendants and thus take relatively few enforcement resources
on the part of the SEC.12 I also do not include reports of investigations and
actions to compel compliance with an administrative subpoena, as these are
infrequent and not representative of the SEC’s everyday enforcement
activities. Lastly, I count multiple enforcement actions that involve the same
underlying activities against the same defendant as a single action.13 The
dataset consists of a total of 851 SEC enforcement actions.
II. THE NUMBER OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The SEC has long highlighted its overall enforcement numbers.14 The
agency also reports its enforcement numbers to Congress for the budget
appropriation process.15 Using the SEC’s numbers, the SEED project at
NYU publishes an annual report detailing the number of enforcement actions
against public companies and subsidiaries of public companies.16 Professor
Velikonja has written several pieces examining the SEC’s reporting of its
enforcement numbers.17
11. This is the same definition of a public company that is used in the NYU SEED
database. Methodology, NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR L. & BUS., https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/
pollackcenterlawbusiness/seed/methodology [https://perma.cc/PD27-YRKN] (last visited
Oct. 3, 2020).
12. See Velikonja, supra note 9, at 941–45 (“[D]elinquent filing actions really are
different from other enforcement actions. Including them in the overall measure of
enforcement output will tend to bias the indicator upward . . . .”).
13. The SEC, in its discretion, may bring follow-on enforcement actions following a
primary enforcement action against the same defendant for the same underlying violation.
These include follow-on actions to impose a suspension or bar or revoke a license. These
follow-on actions do not take as many resources as the primary action and, if included in my
count, would artificially boost the overall number of SEC enforcement actions. For a
discussion of the problems with the SEC’s enforcement reporting, see Velikonja, supra note
9, at 903–04, 932–40.
14. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Division of Enforcement
Publishes
Annual
Report
for
Fiscal
Year
2019
(Nov.
6,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-233 [https://perma.cc/2EX6-TNDS].
15. For a discussion of the role of the SEC’s enforcement numbers in the congressional
budget appropriation process for the SEC, see Velikonja, supra note 9, at 906, 912–15.
16. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RSCH., SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY: PUBLIC COMPANIES
AND SUBSIDIARIES FISCAL YEAR 2019 UPDATE (2019), https://www.cornerstone.com/
Publications/Reports/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-FY-2019-Update [https://perma.cc/B966VZRV].
17. See Urska Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, 50 GA. L. REV. 17, 30–31
(2015) [hereinafter Velikonja, Politics]; Urska Velikonja, Public Enforcement After Kokesh:
Evidence from SEC Actions, 108 GEO. L.J. 389, 394 (forthcoming 2020); Velikonja, supra note
9, at 909 n.33; Urska Velikonja, Behind the Annual SEC Enforcement Report: 2017 and
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Simply observing that the SEC has initiated a certain number of new
enforcement actions in any given year alone is meaningless without knowing
the overall incidence of securities law violations in the economy, which in
turn may depend on the performance of the economy and other market
conditions. Nonetheless, looking at year-over-year trends, so long as no
major shift occurs in the economy during this time frame, may help observers
outside the SEC identify changes in decision-making within the agency that
affect overall enforcement. For example, both the SEED project and
Professor Velikonja noted the drop in enforcement actions from the last year
of the Barack Obama administration to the first year of the Donald Trump
administration.18 More recently, the SEED project published a report in late
2019 that indicated that the SEC’s enforcement numbers in its 2019 fiscal
year were at a high point in the SEED data spanning 2010 to 2019.19
As a starting point, I tabulated the number of SEC enforcement actions
against public companies and subsidiaries of public companies for the 2005
to 2018 period by calendar year, as depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Number of SEC Actions Against Public Companies and
Subsidiaries of Public Companies by Calendar Year

Beyond 1–2 (Nov. 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Velikonja, Annual SEC
Enforcement],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074073
[https://
perma.cc/5QNC-PQ9Q].
18. See CORNERSTONE RSCH., SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY: PUBLIC COMPANIES AND
SUBSIDIARIES FISCAL YEAR 2017 UPDATE 1 (2017), https://www.cornerstone.com/
Publications/Reports/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-2017-Update
[https://perma.cc/4AWBSPP4]; Velikonja, Annual SEC Enforcement, supra note 17, at 1.
19. See CORNERSTONE RSCH., supra note 16, at 1.
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Note in Figure 1 that the number of SEC enforcement actions in 2017 was,
indeed, less than in 2016. If one looks at the monthly average from February
2017 to December 2017—the months that correspond with the new Trump
administration—there was an average of only 3.1 actions per month. This is
compared with an average of 8.2 per month in 2016. The difference between
the average number of monthly SEC actions during the months in 2017 under
the Trump administration and the months in 2016 under the Obama
administration is significant at the 1 percent confidence level.
Looking at the broader picture of SEC enforcement actions from 2005 to
2018, it is unclear whether the overall number of actions in 2017 was the
product of a change within the SEC or some external factor affecting the
number of securities law violations in the economy. To control for external
factors, I propose as a metric the ratio of the number of SEC enforcement
actions to the number of private securities class actions filed each year.
Private plaintiffs’ attorneys drive the filing of securities class actions in the
United States. Importantly, unlike the SEC, private plaintiffs’ attorneys
typically seek one unvarying primary goal: to maximize their own profits.
Presumably, as the number of instances of fraud (that provide the possibility
of a financial return from litigation) that are uncovered rises in any given
year, the number of securities class actions will also rise in that same year.
Looking at the ratio of SEC enforcement actions to securities class actions
filed in any given year will at least partially control for changes in the
underlying number of securities law violations in the economy.
To construct the ratio of SEC enforcement actions to securities class
actions filed in a given year, I obtained the annual number of securities class
action filings from the Cornerstone Research annual report on securities class
action filings.20 I omitted mergers and acquisitions (M&A) filings from my
count of securities class actions. The number of M&A securities class actions
filed in federal court has rapidly increased in the past several years. This
increase is likely due to a ruling in the Delaware Court of Chancery regarding
the potential lack of merits of disclosure-only settlements in M&A objection
lawsuits.21 Because the increase in M&A filings in federal district court in
recent years is not due to any overall increase in private litigation in the
economy but instead is the result of a shift away from Delaware Chancery
Court, I omitted M&A securities class action filings.

20. See CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2018 YEAR IN REVIEW
3–6 (2018), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-ActionFilings-2018-Year-in-Review [https://perma.cc/B8MP-FXPB].
21. See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016). For
commentary on the In re Trulia decision and the subsequent shift to federal courts of M&A
objection-related claims recast as disclosure claims, see Sean J. Griffith, Class Action
Nuisance Suits: Evidence from Frequent Filer Shareholder Plaintiffs 8 (Eur. Corp.
Governance
Inst.
Working
Paper
No.
502/2020)
(forthcoming
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470330
[https://perma.cc/F6C798GY].
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Figure 2 depicts the ratio of newly filed SEC enforcement actions to
securities class actions (omitting M&A class actions) by calendar year.
Figure 2: Ratio of SEC Actions to Securities Class Actions

Note from Figure 2 that the ratio of SEC actions to securities class actions
in 2017 (0.25) is less than half the ratio in 2016 (0.53). Not only did the
number of SEC enforcement actions drop from 2016 to 2017 but the number
of securities class actions did not,22 leading to the decline in the SEC action
to securities class actions ratio. To the extent the ratio at least partially
controls for the overall incidence of securities law violations in the economy,
the ratio provides stronger evidence than looking at enforcement numbers
alone that something changed in SEC enforcement priorities and preferences
in 2017. The ratio jumps back up in 2018 though, indicating that the low in
SEC enforcement is localized to 2017.
Several caveats exist to using the ratio of SEC actions to securities class
actions as a measure of the intensity of SEC enforcement activity, controlling
for the overall incidence of securities law violations in the economy. First,
while private plaintiffs’ attorneys will consistently seek to maximize profits,
the amount of private resources available to bring securities class actions may
vary by year (with changes in law firm structure, introduction of greater
financing for private litigation, and so on). Some of the variation in the ratio
could be due to variations in the resources available to private plaintiffs’
attorneys to bring new securities class actions. Nonetheless, to the extent the
changes in resources are minimal from year to year, using the SEC actions to

22. The number of non-M&A securities class action filings increased from 186 in 2016 to
209 in 2017. See CORNERSTONE RSCH., supra note 20, at 5.
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securities class actions ratio will provide a rough sense of how SEC
enforcement decision-making is changing on a year-over-year basis.
Second, SEC enforcement and private securities class actions may target
overlapping but not identical sets of situations. The SEC may target some
actions that private plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot. Only a subset of the
securities laws is available to private plaintiffs’ attorneys to allege a violation
in a securities class action, including, most importantly, § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193423 (“the Exchange Act”),
prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and
§ 11 of the Securities Act of 193324 (“the Securities Act”), prohibiting
material misstatements or omissions in the registration statement for public
offerings.25 The SEC, in contrast, is tasked with enforcing the entire federal
securities legal regime.26 Nonetheless, while only a subset of the securities
laws can be litigated by private plaintiffs’ attorneys, to the extent changes in
the economy affect the underlying incidence of different types of securities
law violations in a similar way, then looking at the ratio of SEC actions to
class actions will control for these economy-wide changes.27
Third, for the same underlying securities violations, SEC enforcement
actions are often initiated sometime after the filing of a securities class action,
sometimes over a year later. As a robustness check, I computed the ratio of
SEC actions filed in one year to securities class actions filed in the prior year.
Under this alternative ratio, the ratio in 2017 (0.28) was less than half the
ratio in 2016 (0.57). I also computed the ratio of SEC actions in one year to
securities class actions filed in the two previous years. Under this alternative
ratio, the ratio in 2017 (0.31) was also less than half the ratio in 2016 (0.63).
In both alternatives, the ratio test indicates a downward shift in the intensity
of SEC enforcement against public companies and subsidiaries of public
companies in 2017 compared with 2016.
Lastly, the number of SEC actions and the number of securities class
actions may not be independent of one another. The decision to file a
securities class action may depend on the SEC’s enforcement activities.
Most class actions are filed prior to an SEC enforcement action (if any).
However, the public announcement of even preliminary SEC investigation
activity may influence the filing of class actions. Several other factors also
bear on the decisions of plaintiffs’ attorneys to file a class action, including
the market capitalization of the corporate defendant, the amount of share
turnover, the stock price reaction upon announcement of the underlying
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
25. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 241–405, 569–663 (5th ed. 2019).
26. See id. at 857–937.
27. Private plaintiffs’ attorneys may also target some actions that the SEC may not. In
particular, some securities class actions may be frivolous. Nonetheless, so long as the relative
proportion of frivolous to meritorious litigation does not appreciably change from year to year,
the amount of private frivolous litigation will not materially affect the comparison of the ratio
of SEC enforcement actions to securities class actions from one year to the next.

394

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

violation, the presence of a restatement, and so on. It is also possible that the
previous filing of a securities class action may influence the SEC’s decision
whether to bring an enforcement action. For example, there are instances
where private recovery has affected the size of the monetary sanctions the
SEC seeks in enforcement.28
Despite these caveats, even if the SEC action to securities class action ratio
only imperfectly controls for external factors and provides an approximate
view into changes in SEC enforcement decisions over time, tracking these
changes through the ratio will serve as a starting point for more extended
analysis. For example, assuming the drop in SEC enforcement actions and
the ratio of SEC actions to securities class actions in 2017 from 2016 is not
due to external factors, what explains the change in internal SEC decisionmaking in 2017? One hypothesis is that disruption in SEC enforcement
occurs with the transition to a new chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton in the
case of Trump, and new enforcement codirectors, Steve Peikin and Stephanie
Avakian.29 Disruption is temporary and the increase in the number of
enforcement actions, as well as the SEC actions to securities class actions
ratio in 2018, is consistent with a temporary effect on enforcement. In
contrast though, the first year of the Obama administration in 2009 does not
show the same drop in enforcement from the prior year.30 However, the late
2000s financial crisis and the greater need to enforce the securities laws in
response to the crisis may explain the absence of a drop in enforcement
actions in the first year of the Obama administration.
A second hypothesis is that 2017 is not the anomaly. Instead, 2016 is the
anomaly. Possibly in the last year of an administration, SEC leadership
attempts to push through as many enforcement actions as possible before
regime change. However, the lack of a drop between 2008 and 2009 is
inconsistent with this outgoing regime hypothesis. Both Figures 1 and 2 also
depict a steady increase in the number of SEC actions and the ratio of SEC
actions to class actions from 2013 to 2016, coinciding with Mary Jo White’s
tenure as chairman of the SEC and her “broken windows” approach to
enforcement that focused on smaller magnitude cases to increase overall
compliance in the securities industry.31 Despite the focus on smaller
28. On February 25, 2010, federal district Judge Douglas P. Woodlock entered final
judgment against State Street Bank and Trust Company, pursuant to the consent of the SEC
and State Street Bank and Trust Company. As part of the judgment, State Street’s undertaking
to pay $255,240,472 to injured investors took into account a credit of $349,600,887 for
payments State Street had already made to injured investors, including in a class action
settlement. See Final Judgment as to Defendant State Street Bank & Trust Co., SEC v. State
St. Bank & Tr. Co., No. 10-cv-10172 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2010), ECF No. 8.
29. Note, though, that Stephanie Avakian was deputy director of the SEC’s Enforcement
Division from June 2014 to December 2016 and acting director of the Enforcement Division
until her appointment as codirector in June 2017. See Biography, Stephanie Avakian, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/biography/avakian-stephanie [https://perma.cc/F5S9YXML] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
30. See supra Figures 1, 2.
31. See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Securities
Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100913mjw
[https://perma.cc/YV68-ZBXV].
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magnitude cases, the “broken windows” approach also corresponded with a
ramp-up of enforcement against public companies and subsidiaries of public
companies from 2013 to 2016.32 The shift in 2017 may reflect a move away
from Mary Jo White’s particular emphasis on enforcement.
A third hypothesis is that legal changes affected the SEC’s enforcement in
2017. The U.S. Supreme Court decided Kokesh v. SEC33 on June 5, 2017,
and held that the SEC’s disgorgement remedy is a “penalty” and thus is
subject to a five-year statute of limitations.34 To the extent the SEC had
enforcement cases in the pipeline that sought disgorgement and involved
violations that took place beyond the five-year statute of limitations, Kokesh
would have truncated the SEC’s ability to bring such actions.
A fourth hypothesis is that a shift occurred in SEC enforcement priorities.
In a July 2017 speech given shortly after he became chairman of the SEC,
Jay Clayton publicly stated that the SEC would focus on “main street”
securities fraud that affected retail investors.35 In September 2017, the SEC
launched a new task force focused on protecting individual investors.36 One
possibility is that the focus on individual investors shifted the SEC’s focus
toward offering frauds, Ponzi schemes, conflicts of interest, and excessive
brokerage fees and away from large publicly traded companies.37 The drop
in 2017 is consistent with the SEC shifting its enforcement focus under a
constrained budget. Note, though, that the subsequent increase in 2018, as
depicted in Figures 1 and 2, potentially indicates either that the SEC’s shift
in focus toward “main street” did not in fact negatively impact enforcement
against public companies and their subsidiaries or, alternatively, it
demonstrates there was at least a partial shift in the SEC’s priorities away
from “main street” and back toward public companies and their subsidiaries.
An alternative to using annual enforcement numbers is to examine
monthly enforcement numbers. Looking at monthly numbers gives an
indication of whether calendar factors, in addition to specific characteristics
of securities law violations, drives SEC decisions. Normally, one would not
expect seasonality to affect SEC decision-making. The presence of
32. See David Zaring, Mary Jo White’s SEC Legacy: Strong on Enforcement but Not on
Reshaping
Wall
Street,
MARKETWATCH
(Nov.
16,
2016,
2:00
PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/mary-jo-whites-sec-legacy-strong-on-enforcement-butnot-on-reshaping-wall-street-2016-11-16 [https://perma.cc/Z4XR-9Q5K].
33. 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
34. See id. at 1644.
35. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Economic
Club of New York (July 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-economicclub-new-york [https://perma.cc/NCV5-UQP2] (asking “how does what we propose to do
affect the long-term interests of Mr. and Ms. 401(k)?”).
36. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement
Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/3JD6-BUKP].
37. See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 65 (2018) (statement of Jay Clayton, Chairman, United
States Securities and Exchange Commission) (“Going forward, Enforcement will continue to
place a priority on misconduct that harms retail investors, such as offering frauds, Ponzi
schemes, conflicts of interest and inappropriate or excessive fees.”).
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seasonality may indicate that factors other than the characteristics of specific
cases may drive SEC enforcement decisions.
In a study of all SEC enforcement actions from 1998 to 2014, Professor
Velikonja reported that the SEC tended to bring more enforcement actions in
September compared with other months—an effect Velikonja labelled the
“September Swell.”38 Figure 3 depicts the monthly number of SEC
enforcement actions against public companies and subsidiaries of public
companies.39 Unlike Velikonja’s earlier study of monthly enforcement
numbers, Figure 3’s focus on actions against public companies and
subsidiaries of public companies allows an assessment of monthly variation
excluding the low-cost actions identified by Velikonja and including
delinquent filings and follow-on actions brought after an initial primary
action against a defendant that are not included in my dataset of public
companies and subsidiaries of public companies.
Figure 3: Number of SEC Actions Against Public Companies and
Subsidiaries of Public Companies by Month

Note from Figure 3 that, particularly from 2014 onward, there is a “hockey
stick” pattern of enforcement actions spiking in the month of September. The
mean number of actions in September (9.6 actions) from 2005 to 2018
compared with the mean number in October (2.8 actions) is different at the 1
percent confidence level. Not only is there a “September Swell” effect, there
is also an “October Ebb” effect, with significantly lower numbers of actions
38. See Velikonja, Politics, supra note 17, at 30–32.
39. Note that I do not have monthly data on the number of securities class actions from
2005 to 2018, so I did not construct the ratio of SEC actions to securities class actions by
month. I leave this for future research.
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in the month of October. I compared the mean number of actions in October
(2.8 actions) from 2005 to 2018 with the mean number in all months other
than September (4.8 actions). The difference is significant at the 5 percent
confidence level. To test whether there is a shift in importance in the
September and October effects from 2014 onward, I performed a chi-square
test of the proportion of actions in the pre-2014 period versus the 2014onward period that were initiated in September (11.6 percent of all actions
pre-2014 and 21.2 percent of all actions 2014 onward), October (4.1 percent
of all actions pre-2014 and 5.2 percent of all actions from 2014 onward), and
the other months (84.3 percent of all actions pre-2014 and 73.6 percent of all
actions from 2014 onward). The difference between these two periods is
significant at the 1 percent confidence level.
One hypothesis to explain this pattern is that, particularly from 2014
onward, the SEC has become increasingly focused on the enforcement
numbers it reports to the public.40 SEC enforcement reports typically cover
its fiscal year, which runs from October 1 to September 30 of the next year.
If the SEC were focused on meeting certain quantitative target goals, the SEC
may shift enforcement actions that otherwise would require more time from
just after the end of the fiscal year on September 30 to just before the end of
the fiscal year. Such a pattern would lead to the hockey stick pattern of
enforcement actions spiking in September and dropping in October.
From the outside, it is difficult to discern the motives of SEC officials.
Indeed, other hypotheses are possible. It is possible that from 2014 onward,
the SEC happened to change the scheduling of meetings for the agency to
make enforcement decisions to concentrate in September for reasons other
than meeting quantitative targets.
As with the yearly time trends for SEC enforcement actions, the monthly
time trend is only suggestive. Such a hockey stick pattern for earnings and
other financial results for a publicly traded company may not necessarily
indicate an accounting issue but may still cause observers to want to look
more closely at the company’s internal accounting policies. Similarly, the
monthly time trend for the SEC actions raises an issue for further research to
determine the precise cause.
III. STOCK PRICE REACTION TO VIOLATIONS TARGETED FOR
ENFORCEMENT
Beyond counting the number of actions, observers of SEC enforcement
may discern patterns in the agency’s enforcement decisions by looking at the
stock market reaction to the first public announcement of the problem that
led to the eventual SEC enforcement action (referred to here as “the Violation
Date”). Different types of enforcement actions may correspond with
different stock price reactions. When the SEC targets violations with a
40. See Velikonja, Politics, supra note 17, at 19–26 (“If [the SEC] fails to meet any of the
performance goals it has set for itself, it risks losing funds through the budget appropriation
process. As a result, the SEC faces intense pressure to at least meet its performance targets,
and to exceed them if possible.”).
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greater impact on investors, I expect that the stock market reaction to the first
public disclosure of the underlying securities law violation will be greater
than when the SEC targets violations that do not impact investors as much.41
Take the example of the SEC’s enforcement action against Weatherford
International PLC in 2016.42 According to the SEC, “[b]etween 2007 and
2012, Weatherford, a large multinational provider of oil and natural gas
equipment and services, issued false financial statements that inflated its
earnings by over $900 million in violation of U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (‘GAAP’).”43 These accounting violations led
Weatherford to restate its financials three separate times.44 The SEC’s
enforcement action charged Weatherford with fraud under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 of the Exchange Act and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, among other
securities law violations.45 As part of a settlement with the SEC,
Weatherford agreed to pay a $140 million civil penalty.46 What did the
market think of the underlying violation? March 2, 2011, was the first trading
day after Weatherford initially announced nonreliance on its previously
issued financial statements relating to errors at issue in the SEC’s eventual
enforcement action. On this day, over five years prior to the commencement
of the SEC enforcement action, numerous financial news agencies reported
on this nonreliance and Weatherford’s accounting errors.47 The stock price
for Weatherford on March 2, 2011, the Violation Date, fell 10.1 percent.48
In comparison, on July 17, 2018, the SEC brought a settled enforcement
action against BGC Financial, L.P.49 According to the SEC:
41. In an earlier work together with Adam Pritchard, a professor at the University of
Michigan Law School, I used event studies of the Violation Date to assess the targeting of
securities law violations by the SEC compared with private plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities
class actions. See Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 37 (2016).
42. In re Weatherford Int’l PLC, Securities Act Release No. 10221, Exchange Act Release
No. 78944, 2016 WL 5390511 (Sept. 27, 2016).
43. Id. at *2.
44. See id.
45. See id. at *17–18.
46. The SEC also charged Weatherford’s former vice president of tax and former tax
director, each of whom also settled with the SEC. See id. at *23–25.
47. See, e.g., Ryan Dezember & Matt Jarzemsky, Weatherford Discloses Tax-Accounting
Errors,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
2,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703559604576176293277481526 [https://perma.cc/5UBL-EJMQ]; Final
Transcript, Weatherford International to Adjust 2007–2010 Results due to “Material
Weakness” in its Income Tax Reporting—Conference Call, WEATHERFORD INT’L, LTD. (Mar.
2,
2011),
https://weatherford.gcs-web.com/static-files/f5666f7d-fcc4-42fc-bf4690ed8f6f4c6e [https://perma.cc/ZD2L-2KFP]; Weatherford (WFT) Slammed on 10-K Delay
Citing “Material Weakness” in Internal Controls, STREETINSIDER (Mar. 2, 2011, 7:19 AM),
https://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/Weatherford+%28WFT%29+Slammed+On
+10-K+Delay+Citing+%22Material+Weakness%22+in+Internal+Controls/6336592.html
[https://perma.cc/H2UC-3CNN].
48. Note that the -10.1 percent return is the one-day, buy-and-hold raw return.
49. See In re BGC Fin., L.P., Exchange Act Release No. 83650, 2018 WL 3434896 (July
17, 2018). BGC Financial’s parent company is BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly traded company
listed on Nasdaq. See BGC Partners, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 19, 223 (Mar. 1,
2019).
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These proceedings arise out of BGC’s violations of the books and records
provisions of the Exchange Act. First, in June of 2014, BGC deleted audio
files for the recorded lines of eight registered representatives that were
responsive to requests from the Commission staff for these records. As
detailed below, the deletion of these audio files occurred because BGC’s
audio system personnel were not made aware of the existence of the
Commission staff’s requests. Second, in the instances detailed below, BGC
failed to maintain books and records that accurately recorded certain
transactions concerning compensation, travel, entertainment, and other
expenses.50

The SEC charged BGC Financial with willful violation of § 17(a)(1) and
Rule 17a-4(j) of the Exchange Act.51 As part of the settlement, the SEC
censured BGC Financial and imposed a cease and desist order on the
company.52 The agency also imposed a $1.25 million civil penalty.53 There
were no prior public disclosures of the underlying violations at issue in the
BGC enforcement action, making the date of the initiation of the SEC
enforcement action (“the Enforcement Date”) also the Violation Date. The
stock price for the publicly traded parent company, BGC Partners, Inc., on
the Enforcement Date of the SEC’s action did not change, with a return of
0.0 percent.54
Tabulating aggregate numbers of actions alone will not capture the
importance of an SEC enforcement action to the economy. As a proxy for
the value of SEC enforcement, I look at the stock price reaction on the
Violation Date. In the case where a subsidiary of a public company is the
target of an SEC enforcement action, I look at the stock price reaction for the
public company parent of the subsidiary. The stock price reaction to the
underlying securities law violation captures the market’s view of the impact
of the violation on the investors of the publicly traded company.
To determine the Violation Date, I performed Nexis and Factiva searches
on news stories, press releases, and business wires to determine the first
public disclosure of the problem leading to the investigation or class action.
I also searched SEC EDGAR filings. When possible, I obtained a time stamp
of the initial public disclosure of the violation and treated disclosures that
occurred after 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time as having occurred on the next
trading day. I also obtained the Enforcement Date from the SEC document
initiating the action, which was typically either a litigation release,
complaint, or administrative proceeding filing.
To assess the stock price impact of information revealed prior to the SEC
Enforcement Date, I performed an event study of the Violation Date to
control for overall market movements. For comparison, I also performed an
event study of the first public disclosure of the initiation of the Enforcement

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

In re BGC Fin., L.P., 2018 WL 3434896, at *2.
Id. at *6–7.
See id. at *7.
See id.
Note that the 0.0 percent return is the one-day, buy-and-hold raw return.
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Date.55 For each event study, I estimated a market model using data for up
to 255 trading days and ending forty-six days before the event date. For the
market index return in the market model, I used the equally weighted CRSP
market portfolio return. I used the market model to estimate expected returns
for each event date. For each event study, I computed the one-day abnormal
return by subtracting the expected return from the actual return for the event
date. Table 1 reports the mean one-day abnormal return for the Violation
and Enforcement Dates.56
Table 1: Mean One-Day Abnormal Returns for Violation and Enforcement
Dates

Date

N

Mean
Abnormal
Return

p value

Positive:Negative

Violation
Date

691

-0.0273

0.000

247:444**

Enforcement
Date

690

-0.0014

0.289

340:350

The p value is from a test of the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal
return is equal to zero, using cross-sectional standard errors for abnormal
returns.57 The significance from a one-sided generalized sign test of the
proportion of positive CARs is: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Note from Table 1 that the market reacted negatively to the first public
disclosure of a securities law violation, on average, with a -2.73 percent
abnormal return. This return is significantly different from zero at the 1
percent confidence level. In contrast, the abnormal return on an SEC
enforcement action announcement is not significantly different from zero.58
55. Note that for some of the SEC actions there was no disclosure of the violation prior to
the enforcement announcement and the Violation Date in such actions is the Enforcement
Date. I separately compute the abnormal return for Violation Dates with prior disclosure to
the Enforcement Date and the abnormal return for Violation Dates with no prior disclosure.
See infra Table 2.
56. It is possible that for some of the dates the disclosure occurred after the close of
trading. For robustness, I also performed a two-day event study going from the event date (0)
to the next trading day (+1). The two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the Violation
Date is -3.34 percent and is significant at the 1 percent level. The two-day CAR for the
Enforcement Date is -0.03 percent and is not significantly different from zero.
57. For a discussion of event study methodology, see generally A. Craig MacKinlay,
Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13 (1997). I also tested the
null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero using a standardized crosssectional test following an article by Ekkehart Boehmer, Jim Musumeci, and Annette B.
Poulsen. Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Event-Study Methodology Under Conditions of EventInduced Variance, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 259–60 (1991) (the BMP test). I obtained the same
qualitative results as in Table 1 using the BMP test.
58. These results differ from those in an earlier study by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin. See
Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the
Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 591 (2008). Karpoff et al.’s sample, unlike
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Figure 4 depicts the mean abnormal return on the Violation Date each year
from 2005 to 2018.
Figure 4: Violation Date Abnormal Return

As depicted in Figure 4, the mean abnormal return is lowest in 2017 with
a mean abnormal return of -1.1 percent. The difference between the 2017
return and the mean return for the other years in the sample (-2.9 percent) is
significant at the 5 percent confidence level, although the difference between
the 2017 return and the 2016 return (-1.8 percent) is not significant.59
There are several caveats to looking at stock price reactions to the
underlying securities law violations over time. First, my analysis focuses
only on the first public disclosure of the underlying securities law violations.
It is possible that the true extent of a company’s securities law violations may
become public over time across a series of disclosures. Focusing on just the
first public disclosure date may understate the overall market reaction to
specific securities law violations. Nonetheless, to the extent the average
amount of understatement for SEC enforcement actions is similar from one
year to the next in my sample, a comparison of the mean abnormal return for
different years will reflect differences in the SEC’s targeting of enforcement

mine, focuses only on SEC enforcement actions involving financial misrepresentation from
1978 to 2005. See id. at 581. Using their sample, they report a -25.24 percent mean abnormal
return for what they call “trigger events” that led to the SEC enforcement and are identified
by looking at federal proceedings. See id. at 590–91. They report a -9.60 percent mean
abnormal return for the initial announcement of a “regulatory event,” which they define as an
“official administrative or litigation release by the SEC or the DOJ.” See id. at 591–92.
59. For the t-test of differences in abnormal returns by year, I used a Satterthwaite t-test
to account for the possibility of unequal variances. As discussed in Part VI below, there are
considerable differences in the variance of abnormal returns by year in the dataset. To
examine whether 2017 is different from the other years in my sample, I performed a test of
the equality of variances for the variance in the 2017 abnormal returns and the variance in the
abnormal returns for the other years. The test rejected the null hypothesis that the variances
are equal at the 5 percent confidence level.
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actions based on the impact on investors of the underlying securities law
violations.
Second, the pool of securities law violations in the economy in any given
year may vary. Some years may have violations with greater negative stock
market reactions as compared with other years. The large average negative
abnormal returns in 2008–2012 in Figure 4, for example, may be the result
of the late 2000s financial crisis. One possible control for the pool of
securities law violations would be to use the abnormal return on the Violation
Date for securities class actions as a control. If the pool of securities law
violations changes from year to year, the abnormal return on the Violation
Date for securities class actions should vary with this changing pool. I leave
the construction of such a control to future research.
Lastly, looking at the stock market price reaction to the underlying
violation may not fully capture the social value of enforcement. It is possible,
for example, in the case of the BGC Financial enforcement action discussed
above, that the deterrent effect of the SEC enforcement action on all financial
firms in the future may sum to a large overall impact on social welfare in a
way not captured by looking solely at the stock price reaction for BGC
Financial upon announcement of the violation. In addition, it may be that
enforcing the securities laws against a brokerage firms’ registered
representatives may not greatly affect shareholder value for the brokerage
firm but nonetheless increase value for the customers of the brokerage firm.
Despite the imperfect match between stock price reaction on the Violation
Date and the social value of enforcement, looking at the stock price reaction
to the first disclosure of the violation over time provides information on the
SEC’s enforcement priorities and the opportunity cost of these priorities. It
may be that SEC actions that target violations that do not result in large stock
price declines may nonetheless have high social value. But identifying those
actions without a large Violation Date stock price decline at least poses the
question of exactly how such other social value exists and whether this value
offsets the opportunity cost of expending limited SEC enforcement resources
on such actions as opposed to other violations that resulted in large negative
stock price declines.
IV. PRIOR DISCLOSURE VERSUS NO PRIOR DISCLOSURE ACTIONS
Most SEC enforcement actions occur after a prior disclosure of the
violation. In my sample from 2005 to 2018, 74.5 percent of the SEC
enforcement actions had public disclosure of the underlying violation before
the initiation of the action. I posit that market participants will tend to
uncover and corporations will tend to voluntarily disclose more material
violations of the securities laws. Accordingly, those SEC enforcement
actions that occur when there is no prior disclosure of the violation tend to
not involve as major securities law violations. The enforcement action
against BGC Financial discussed in Part III is an example of an enforcement
action that did not have any disclosure of the underlying violations prior to
the initiation of the action. Looking at the fraction of actions that the SEC
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brings where there is no prior disclosure of the underlying securities law
violation provides another way of assessing the impact of the actions that the
SEC brings.
As a check on whether no prior disclosure SEC enforcement actions
involve violations with less investor impact than actions where there is prior
disclosure of the violations, I computed the mean one-day abnormal return
from an event study for the Violation Date for those actions with disclosure
of the violation prior to the enforcement action. I also computed the mean
one-day abnormal return from an event study for the Violation Date for those
actions with no prior disclosure of the violations. Because the Enforcement
Date is the first time that the market learns of the underlying securities law
violation for the no prior disclosure actions, I use the Enforcement Date as
the Violation Date for the actions without prior disclosure. Table 2 reports
the results from the event study.
Table 2: Mean Abnormal One-Day Returns on the Violation Date for
Actions with and Without Prior Disclosure of the Violation Prior to the
Enforcement Date

Date
Violation Date
with Prior
Disclosure
Violation Date
with No Prior
Disclosure (the
Enforcement
Date)

Mean
Abnormal
Return

p value

499

-0.0364

0.000

164:335**

192

-0.0037

0.025

83:109+

N

Positive:Negative

The p value is from a test of the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal
return is equal to zero using cross-sectional standard errors for abnormal
returns.60 The significance from a one-sided generalized sign test of the
proportion of positive CARs is: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Note from Table 2 that the abnormal return for the Violation Date for
actions with prior disclosure of the violation is -3.64 percent, while it is -0.37
percent for the Violation Date for actions with no prior disclosure (i.e., the
Enforcement Date). This is an almost tenfold decrease in magnitude. The
difference in abnormal returns for no prior disclosure and prior disclosure
actions is significant at the 1 percent confidence level.

60. For a discussion of event study methodology, see MacKinlay, supra note 57. I also
tested the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero using a standardized
cross-sectional test. See supra note 57. I obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 2
using the BMP test.
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Note that most of the no prior disclosure actions involve financial
institutions, such as BGC Financial. While 40.7 percent of the actions with
prior disclosure involved companies in Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) one-digit code 6 (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate), 89.1 percent of
actions with no prior disclosure were in SIC code 6.61 This difference is
significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Figure 5 depicts the fraction of
all SEC actions against public companies and subsidiaries of public
companies that are no prior disclosure actions by year for the 2005 to 2018
period.
Figure 5: Fraction of SEC Actions Against Public Companies and
Subsidiaries of Public Companies with No Prior Disclosure

Note from Figure 5 that the mean fraction of SEC enforcement actions that
did not follow a disclosure of the underlying violations was 0.12 from 2005
to 2013. From 2014 onward, the fraction of SEC enforcement actions that
did not follow a disclosure of the underlying violations increased to 0.43 on
average. The difference between these two fractions is significant at the 1
percent level.
What explains the increase in the fraction of no prior disclosure actions
from 2014 onward? One hypothesis is that the SEC enjoys greater discretion
in the timing and nature of enforcement actions against the financial
institutions it regulates. When the SEC faces pressure to meet numerical
enforcement goals, for example due to the congressional appropriations
61. For a list of the SIC codes used by the SEC, see Division of Corporation Finance:
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code List, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm [https://perma.cc/JL5S-VHNF] (last visited
Oct. 3, 2020).
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process, the SEC may turn to financial institutions as “easy” targets (which
are under close regulation by the SEC) and allege increasingly more
marginal, technical violations to boost its enforcement numbers.62
The lack of market reaction on average to the no prior disclosure actions
is consistent with such actions being viewed by the market as more marginal.
Other explanations are possible. A competing hypothesis is that enforcement
actions against financial firms brought by the SEC from 2014 onward
targeted violations that financial firms did not consider material to the firms’
investors and thus were not disclosed prior to the enforcement action.
Despite the lack of materiality to investors, the enforcement actions could
still have improved overall social welfare when taking into account the
benefits to other groups, such as the benefits to customers of a brokerage
firm, for example, when the SEC enforces the brokerage firm’s duties to
supervise its brokers. One may wonder, though, why a brokerage firm’s
shareholders would not capture the benefits to customers who are better
protected against broker misconduct to the extent the customers are more
willing to buy and sell securities through that brokerage firm. It is possible
that industry-wide “sweeps” by the SEC may not result in greater customer
confidence accruing to any single brokerage firm, explaining the lack of
materiality to the investors of a specific firm. However, the sweep may still
benefit the customers of all brokerage firms in the aggregate. Another
alternative hypothesis is that firms redefined what they view as a “material”
violation from 2014 onward, which lead to a shift in firm violation disclosure
practice and a rise in no prior disclosure SEC enforcement actions. It is
unclear, however, why firms would have changed their view of materiality
in this time period.
Given possible competing hypotheses to explain the rise of no prior
disclosure enforcement actions from 2014 onward, the analysis of prior
versus no prior disclosure actions is only a starting point. But by raising the
question of why there is such a pattern—the increasing fractions of no prior
disclosure actions from 2014 onward—the no prior disclosure metric may
help focus research on answering this question.
V. VARIABILITY IN SEC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS
The SEC enjoys broad prosecutorial discretion in whether and how it
brings enforcement actions.63 Using this discretion, the SEC may bring a
62. Professor Velikonja posits a similar dynamic may lead the SEC to bring more
delinquent filing enforcement actions that are strict liability and provide the SEC a low-cost
way of increasing the number of enforcement actions. See Velikonja, supra note 9, at 969
(“Contested cases consume greater resources, so the agency has an incentive to bring cases
that are more easily brought: delinquent filing actions where targeted firms put up no
resistance, strict-liability offenses, and actions that do not allege violations of the antifraud
provisions of securities laws.”).
63. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Report of Investigation
and Statement Setting Forth Framework for Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct.
23,
2001),
http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/
prosdiscretion.htm [https://perma.cc/J54E-6P93].
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civil action instead of an administrative proceeding. The SEC action could:
allege negligence instead of fraud, impose a smaller or larger penalty, target
a broader or narrower range of corporate activities, or bring charges against
a broader or narrower set of defendants.
How the SEC uses its enforcement discretion will potentially affect the
stock price response to the announcement of an SEC enforcement action.
Determining the variability in abnormal returns for the stock of companies
that face SEC enforcement actions due to the agency’s discretion is difficult
because the abnormal return may vary due to other factors. The
announcement of an SEC enforcement action may contain new information
on the underlying securities law violations. Defendant companies in
different industries may face greater (or lesser) amounts of variation due to
an enforcement action. The underlying securities law violation may also
affect the variation that occurs when the SEC announces an enforcement
action. Violations that involve allegations that a financial firm failed to
supervise its brokers may have less variation in the market response than an
enforcement action where the violations involve the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.64
While I leave the determination of a full set of controls for the various
factors that may affect the variability in how the market responds to an
enforcement action for later research, I take a first-cut analysis of variation
due to the SEC’s use of discretion for similar types of SEC actions. I focus
on the subset of actions in my sample that the SEC treated as an Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) action involving financial
reporting.65 Focusing on only AAER actions at least partially controls for
the nature of the underlying securities law violations that may affect the
variability of the market’s response to an enforcement announcement.
I only use those actions with disclosure of the underlying financial
reporting related violation that occurred prior to the SEC enforcement action
announcement. Focusing on actions with prior disclosure reduces the
importance of price movements on the Enforcement Date due to information
related to the violations. The presence of prior disclosure of the violations
also allows the market to form predictions on the type of enforcement action
that the defendant company will face. The subsequent price reaction on the
Enforcement Date will incorporate the market’s reaction to the unexpected
nature of the enforcement action. It is possible that even with prior
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3.
65. The SEC provides a list of AAER actions on its website. See Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce/friactions.shtml [https://perma.cc/8PPH-83BY] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). The SEC
notes the following on its AAER list:
The list below provides links to financial reporting related enforcement actions
concerning civil lawsuits brought by the Commission in federal court and notices
and orders concerning the institution and/or settlement of administrative
proceedings. This list only highlights certain actions and is not meant to be a
complete and exhaustive compilation of all of the actions that fall into this category.
Id. While not comprehensive, the SEC’s AAER list focuses on a common category of SEC
violations—those involving financial reporting.
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disclosure, some new incremental information on the underlying violation
may be disclosed on the Enforcement Date. Any incremental new disclosure
will likely turn on the nature of the violation and the disclosure practices of
firms that committed the violations (which determines the amount of prior
disclosure and thus what information is left undisclosed up to the
Enforcement Date) and not on the SEC’s use of discretion. To the extent the
factors that affect how firms disclose their securities law violations remain
relatively constant from one year to the next, the level of variability due to
new information about the underlying violation should also remain constant.
Observing changes in the variability over time will therefore reveal changes
in the predictability of SEC decision-making.
To measure the overall variability of the SEC’s use of discretion, I
computed the standard deviation of the one-day abnormal return to the
enforcement action announcement annually from 2005 to 2018 for AAER
enforcement actions with prior disclosure of the underlying violations.
Figure 6 depicts these standard deviations by year.
Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Enforcement Date Abnormal Returns
AAER Actions with Prior Disclosure

From Figure 6 note that there were two spikes in the standard deviation of
abnormal returns for the announcement of an AAER SEC enforcement action
that follows a prior violation disclosure. In 2009, the first year of the Obama
administration, there was an increase in the standard deviation of abnormal
returns to more than double the year prior and the year after. Similarly, in
2018, the second year of the Trump administration, there was an increase in
the standard deviation to more than double the prior year. A test of the
difference between the variances of abnormal returns in 2009 and 2018
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compared with the other years in my sample rejects the null hypothesis of no
difference at the 1 percent confidence level.
Why might the SEC’s use of discretion relative to prior market
expectations change in 2009 and 2018? One hypothesis is that in the early
years of a new administration, with typically a new SEC chairman, there is
greater uncertainty in how the SEC will apply its discretion, leading to greater
variability on the enforcement announcement date. Another explanation is
that the SEC changed its enforcement priorities in specific years, for example
in 2009 and 2018, leading to greater unpredictability in the market response
to an enforcement action. In 2009, for example, in the fallout from the late
2000s financial crisis, the SEC was under intense pressure to bring
enforcement actions. This pressure may have affected SEC internal
enforcement decisions in ways that the market was not entirely able to
predict. Several other factors may have also negatively affected the market’s
ability to predict the SEC’s use of its discretion in enforcement actions, such
as: the arrival of a new SEC chairman, the shift in priorities toward “main
street” fraud, and the initial drop in enforcement actions against public
companies in 2017, followed by an increase in 2018. These other factors
may have resulted in a higher standard deviation for abnormal returns on the
enforcement date in 2018.
Figure 6 provides at least a preliminary view into the importance of the
SEC’s discretion in how it prosecutes enforcement actions and how the use
of this discretion may vary from market expectations in certain time periods.
While only the first step, providing analysis on the variability of the abnormal
return over time, as with the other metrics above, can help pose an important
question: why did unpredictability increase in 2009 and 2018?
CONCLUSION
While the SEC reports enforcement statistics on an annual basis, many of
the internal decisions within the SEC that lead to enforcement actions remain
opaque to outside observers. This Article takes preliminary steps in
constructing several metrics of SEC decision-making that may be regularly
updated using publicly available data to demonstrate how SEC decisionmaking changes over time. While no one measure is perfect, the different
measures this Article constructs help identify when changes and new patterns
of enforcement arise. Once identified, these changes and new patterns may
focus attention in the marketplace and lead to more research on internal
decision-making at the SEC.

